

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are pleased to enclose the latest edition of our *Quarterly Review of Recent Decisions* edited by Rex Linder, and trust that you will find this helpful in your day-to-day handling of claims. We are proud to highlight with this edition the great work of our Trucking/Motor Carrier Litigation and Construction Practice groups.

The attorneys in our Trucking/Motor Carrier Litigation Practice help businesses navigate a vast array of laws and regulations, and have managed all aspects of transportation litigation from investigation through trial or administrative proceedings, and appeals (when necessary). Our Trucking/Motor Carrier Practice Co-Chairs **Joe Feehan** and **Matt Hefflefinger** have successfully tried and mediated numerous trucking cases involving serious injuries throughout Illinois. Joe is a member of the Trucking Industry Defense Association and has spoken and published in the area, including presentations and articles on "Investigating Catastrophic Accidents" and "Defending Motor Carrier Crash Cases From Occurrence to Trial" for the Illinois Institute of Continuing Legal Education. Matt has also spoken and published in the area, including the article "Punitive Damages in Trucking Litigation: Recognizing Risk and Assessing Exposure" for the DRI Trucking Law Committee. He also recently spoke at the Committee's inaugural "Defense Litigation Primer" on investigating trucking accidents and the preserving evidence to protect clients. In addition to Joe and Matt in our Peoria office, our experienced Trucking/Motor Carrier Practice attorneys located around the state include: **Mike Denning**, **Mark McClenathan**, **Brent Swanson** and **Chuck Timmerwilke** in Rockford; **Steve Ayres** in Chicago; **Brad Peterson** in Urbana; **Gary Schwab** in Springfield; and **Doug Heise** in Edwardsville.

The attorneys in our Construction Practice have represented construction companies, building and road contractors/subcontractors, project management firms, owners, developers, engineers, and architects in a wide range of litigation, in alternative methods of dispute resolution, and in the areas of transactional and construction law. They have defended suits involving personal injury and wrongful death cases, as well as construction and design defect cases, construction delay-related claims, and contract disputes. They have also represented construction clients and property owners in contract negotiations, procurement and bidding requirements, and performance and payment matters – including mechanics liens and bond claims. Our Construction Practice team understands the inner workings of major building projects and advises clients on issues of liability, risk management, insurance coverage and risk shifting in construction contracts, and duties and obligations arising out of contractual relationships. **Mark McClenathan** (Rockford, Chicago), Chair of the Construction Practice, has an extensive background in building construction and mechanics. He has handled cases in state courts in more than 19 counties in northern Illinois and in federal court. Mark is an active member of the Construction Committee of the Illinois Defense Council and the Defense Research Institute. Our Construction Practice attorneys who offer clients experienced counsel no matter where they do business or a case is venued include: **Steve Ayres** and **Maura Yusof** in Chicago; **Chuck Timmerwilke** in Rockford; **Rob Bennett**, **Nick Bertschy**, **Mark Hansen**, **Matt Hefflefinger**, and **Gary Nelson** in Peoria; **Keith Fruehling** and **Brad Peterson** in Urbana; **Mike Kokal** in Springfield; and **Doug Heise** and **Barry Noeltner** in Edwardsville.

We invite you to contact our attorneys in these practices should you have questions regarding cases involving trucking or construction law.



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# QUARTERLY REVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS


 HEYL  
ROYSTER

Summer 2013

## INSURANCE COVERAGE

### **Porch Collapse Killing 12 and Injuring 29 Was One Occurrence Even Though Some People Died Weeks Later**

A three-story porch collapsed during a party resulting in the deaths of 12 people and injuries to 29 others. The estates of the deceased and the injured plaintiffs ultimately settled their claims with the building owner. The primary carrier paid its \$1 million per occurrence limits. The excess carrier paid the amounts above the primary carrier, but then filed suit against the primary carrier. It sought to require the primary carrier to pay its full \$2 million limits contending there was more than one occurrence because a number of people died days and weeks after the collapse. The trial court ruled in favor of the primary carrier holding there was one occurrence, and it was only obligated to pay \$1 million.

The First District affirmed. There was no dispute that the porch collapse was the sole cause of all plaintiffs' injuries and death. There was no contention that any separate or intervening act or circumstance contributed to those injuries. Consequently, under the

policy terms, it was one occurrence, and the single occurrence limit of liability applied. *Ware v. First Specialty Ins. Corp.*, 2012 IL App (1st) 113340.

### **Homeowner's Policy Did Not Cover Suit Against Insured Accountant Filed by Her Clients to Recover Costs Associated With Protecting Information on a Compact Disc Stolen From the Insured's Car**

While employed at an accounting firm, the insured had a compact disc belonging to the firm stolen from her personal auto which contained confidential information belonging to her clients. The clients sued her for credit monitoring and insurance expenses incurred to mitigate potential misuse of the stolen information. She tendered the defense of the case to her homeowner's insurance carrier and it then filed the present declaratory judgment action seeking a determination it did not need to defend or indemnify the insured. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the carrier.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The policy did not cover property damage occupied or used by the insured. It also had a business op-

erations exclusion. The Court held both provisions supported the trial court's determination no coverage existed. *Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Central Laborers' Pension Fund*, 7th Cir. Docket No. 12-1784 (1/11/13)

### **Policy Language Prevented Insureds from Stacking UIM Coverage**

State Farm filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that it owed no underinsured motorist coverage to two insureds in an accident. The insureds had five separate policies, each with UIM coverage of \$100,000. They recovered \$250,000 from the adverse driver's insurance carrier and sought to stack the coverage from their five policies to receive an additional \$250,000 from State Farm. The trial court held the policy language clearly limited the total liability from all policies to the "limit of liability of the single policy providing the highest limit of liability."

The Second District affirmed. It rejected Plaintiff's claim that the declarations page created an ambiguity with the policy language. The declarations pages, read in isolation, might raise the question of stacking but the anti-stacking

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provision unambiguously limited coverage. *State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. McFadden*, 2012 IL App (2d) 120272.

### **Insured's Teenage Daughter Entitled to UIM Benefits for Injuries Sustained While a Passenger in an Acquaintance's Auto**

The insured's daughter was injured while riding in a car driven by a friend. Her medical bills exceeded the \$50,000 bodily injury coverage of the driver, and consequently, she sought underinsured motorist benefits under her father's policy which had limits of \$300,000. The carrier filed a declaratory judgment action asserting the daughter was not entitled to UIM benefits because the car in which she was riding was not a "covered auto." The trial court entered summary judgment for the insured's daughter.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The UIM endorsement defined who was an insured to include the named insured and family members with no requirement that they occupy a covered auto. There is no question the insured's teenage daughter was a family member. The Court noted that UM and UIM coverage can protect insureds whether they are passengers in a motor vehicle or engaged in another activity such as

walking, riding a bicycle or other situation involving injuries sustained from contact with an auto. *Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Haight*, 7th Cir. Docket No. 11-1600 (9/26/12).

### **Policy Language Precluded Replacement Cost for Equipment More Than Five Years Old**

The Plaintiff was a contractor whose crane was destroyed in an unexpected microburst storm. It filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to recover replacement costs for damaged property and statutory penalties for vexatious refusal to settle the claim. The policy provided the carrier would pay for the replacement cost of equipment less than five years old. However, it was undisputed the crane was older and the trial court ruled in favor of the carrier.

The First District affirmed. The crane was manufactured 15 years before the incident and, consequently, Travelers would only be obligated to pay the actual cash value which was less than the \$25,000 deductible under the policy. Further, it was a legitimate dispute and Travelers could not be guilty of vexatious refusal to settle. *Area Erectors v. Travelers Property Casualty Co.*, 2012 IL App (1st) 111764.

## **SETTLEMENTS AND RELEASES**

### **Exculpatory Release Barred Claim by Salvation Army Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Participant**

Plaintiff entered a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program at the Salvation Army. As part of the program, participants were expected to participate in work therapy by performing assigned tasks under the supervision of Salvation Army employees. While participating in the program he fell from a ladder injuring his wrist and sued the Salvation Army for negligence. As a condition for participation, plaintiff signed an exculpatory release protecting the Salvation Army "from any and all liability" in connection with his participation. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant.

The Fourth District affirmed. An exculpatory release is enforceable unless it is against public policy or there is something in the relationship of the parties militating against upholding it. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that he should be considered an employee or that he was economically compelled to execute the release, either of which would have barred enforcement. It held no employment relationship existed, and plaintiff's participation in the

program was voluntary. *McKinney v. Castleman*, 2013 IL App (4th) 110098.

**Exculpatory Release Signed by Bicycle Race Participant Applied to Warm-Up Session Collision With Non-Participant**

Plaintiff's bicyclist was injured when he collided with a non-participating bicyclist while warming up prior to a race. As a condition for participation, plaintiff signed a release waiving any claims against the race organizers or other participants in connection with a "collision with pedestrians, vehicles, other riders, and fixed or moving objects..." Plaintiff claimed the release should not apply because the race was supposed to have been closed keeping non-participants out of the area. The trial court enforced the release and dismissed the Complaint.

The First District affirmed. Regardless of whether the course was closed, the Release plainly contemplated the possibility of pedestrians, vehicles, other riders or other objects on the course. Therefore, it contemplated the risk that plaintiff could collide with a non-participant bicyclist. *Hellweg v. Special Events Management*, 2011 IL App (1st) 103604.

**SERVICE OF PROCESS**

**Dismissal Affirmed Where Plaintiff Did Not Obtain Service of Process for 13 Months After Filing Suit**

On February 16, 2007, plaintiff was rear-ended by the defendant. She filed suit on February 13, 2009. Plaintiff performed five skip traces on the defendant to find the correct address for service. Eventually, plaintiff obtained service on the defendant 13 months after the Complaint had been filed. However, the original accident report contained the correct address of the defendant, and consequently, the trial court held plaintiff did not exercise due diligence in obtaining service, and the Complaint was dismissed.

The First District affirmed. Once a defendant establishes the time between filing of the Complaint and date of service suggests lack of diligence, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, the trial court's discretion will not be reversed on appeal. The Court felt it was fatal that plaintiff failed to consult the accident report which contained the defendant's correct address. *Emrikson v. Morfin*, 2012 IL App (1st) 111687.

**ARBITRATION**

**Plaintiff Cannot Voluntarily Dismiss Case to Avoid Adverse Arbitration Decision**

Plaintiff was a passenger in an auto involved in an accident and sued both drivers. After mandatory arbitration proceedings and the entry of a decision in defendants' favor, plaintiff filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss her case without prejudice. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion and denied the defendants' motion for entry of judgment on the arbitration award.

The First District reversed. After the arbitrators found in favor of defendants, plaintiff had 30 days to file a rejection of the award and proceed to trial. She failed to do so but instead filed a motion for voluntary dismissal. Supreme Court Rule 92(c) provides that when a rejection is not filed, a party may move the court to enter judgment on the award. As plaintiff did not file a rejection, judgment should have been entered for the defendants. *Swain v. Bruce*, 2012 IL App (1st) 110425.



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### IMMUNITY

#### **Two Companies Retained by Plaintiff's Employer to Perform Safety Inspections Were Immune from Common Law Liability For Employee's Injury**

Plaintiff suffered severe injuries when she fell from the first floor opening of a manlift platform which had no guardrail. The Defendants were safety consultants for Plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff claimed the lack of guardrail violated various OSHA regulations for which the employer was cited and the consultants should be responsible. Based upon Section 5(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, the trial court granted summary judgment holding the Defendants were immune.

The First District affirmed. Section 5(a) provides there is no cause of action for damages against an "employer, his insurer, his broker, or any service organization retained by the employer ..." It held the safety consultants were service organizations hired by the employer and therefore entitled to immunity. *Mockbee v. Humphrey Manlift Co.*, 2012 IL App (1st) 093189.

#### **Student Has No Negligence Claim Against High School for Accident in Gymnasium**

Plaintiff was a student at the Defendant high school who was

injured in the gymnasium when a volleyball net crank she was turning either broke loose or snapped back, striking her in the face. Plaintiff alleged various acts which she contended amounted to wilful and wanton misconduct. The local governmental tort immunity act provides that any local public entity is only liable for wilful and wanton misconduct for injuries relating to "public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes ..." The trial court held that these allegations did not constitute wilful or wanton misconduct and dismissed the complaint.

The Second District affirmed. Even accepting as true, Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendant was aware of prior difficulties with the equipment, the allegation did not support a claim of wilful or wanton misconduct. Arguably, the school may have been negligent, but it did not act with an utter indifference to a conscious disregard for Plaintiff's safety. *Leja v. Community Unit School District 300*, 2012 IL App (2d) 120156.

#### **Recreational Property Immunity Statute Applied to Unnatural Accumulation of Snow on Park District Parking Lot**

Plaintiff's decedent slipped and fell in a parking lot leaving a Chicago Park District field house. She stepped on an unnatural accumulation of snow left from plowing, fractured her leg, suffered compli-

cations which led to brain damage and died. The trial court certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether "an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice constitutes the existence of a condition of any public property" of the Tort Immunity Act. The First District answered the question no.

The Supreme Court reversed. The statute applies to the "existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes..." The Court held an unnatural accumulation of snow would be a condition of public property, and therefore, the immunity statute applied. *Moore v. Chicago Park District*, 2012 IL 112788.

### SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

#### **Plaintiff's Employer Had No Duty To Preserve I-Beam Which Collapsed Injuring Workers**

Plaintiffs were employees of a general contractor working on a bridge over a creek. While installing a handrail, a concrete I-beam used to support the bridge deck collapsed causing plaintiffs to fall into the creek and be injured. The next day, plaintiffs' employer destroyed the I-beam by breaking up the concrete portion of the beam with a hydraulic hammer. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against various defendants and included a claim against their employer for spoliation of evidence. Plaintiffs

and the employer both moved for summary judgment on the spoliation issue, and the trial court held the defendant had no duty to preserve the I-beam. However, the Fifth District reversed.

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the employer. The general rule in Illinois is that there is no duty to preserve evidence. However, if a defendant voluntarily undertook to preserve an I-beam for its own purposes or other special circumstances exist, a duty is imposed. The employer did not manifest an intention to preserve the I-beam as evidence or even acknowledge its significance as evidence in potential future litigation. It never moved the I-beam from its position in the creek where it fell. Nor did it relocate the beam to a place where it would be protected from loss or destruction. The fact that the defendant was plaintiffs' employer did not create a special circumstance creating a duty to preserve the I-beam. *Martin v. Keeley & Sons, Inc.*, 2012 IL 113270.

## PREMISES LIABILITY

### **Defendant's Failure to Remove Snow and Ice Mounds Did Not Amount to Reckless Disregard of Safety Under Snow Removal Act**

Plaintiff resident brought a neg-

ligence action against a condominium association and property manager for injuries sustained when she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk. She claimed icy snow mounds were formed by snow that was plowed from the parking lot onto the rear entrance sidewalk that led to the building. The defendants moved for summary judgment asserting the Snow Removal Act (745 ILCS 75/2) granted immunity for negligence arising out snow and ice removal from residential sidewalks. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment holding the defendants were immune from claims of negligent snow and ice removal and that their conduct was not willful and wanton. It also held the Act took priority over a local municipal ordinance.

The First District affirmed. The Act provides that an owner is not liable for personal injuries "caused by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk resulting from his or her acts or omissions unless the alleged misconduct is willful or wanton." The failure to remove the snow and ice mounds was an omission, and the defendants were immune. It also held the local ordinance would not apply because the sidewalk was private property. *Pikovsky v. 8440-8460 North Skokie Blvd. Condo.*, 2011 IL App (1st) 103742.

### **City Not Liable as Alleged Dangerous Condition of Street Was Open and Obvious**

Plaintiff was walking to church and was crossing through an intersection which had resurfacing work being done. She fractured her foot as she stepped on the portion of the street that had been excavated, refilled with concrete, but not yet resurfaced. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City holding the condition of the street was open and obvious as a matter of law. They also refused to employ the deliberate encounter exception.

The First District affirmed. There is no duty of care owed by a landowner regarding open and obvious conditions because the landowner can expect people will exercise reasonable care for their own safety. In the present case, the condition itself served as notice of the danger triggering Plaintiff's duty to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. It also held evidence established that Plaintiff did not deliberately encounter the open and obvious condition. *Ballog v. The City of Chicago*, 2012 IL App (1st) 112429.

### **Fireman's Rule Did Not Bar Claim by Firefighter Investigating False Fire Alarm**

Plaintiff was a firefighter injured when he fell responding to a fire alarm at the defendant's warehouse. He was directed to inves-

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tigate a trouble fire alarm and fell through an 11-foot drop off to the ground floor fracturing his spine. He fell because the warehouse was dark and a light switch could not be found until after the incident. Yellow and black stripe safety tape that had earlier been installed was worn out and not replaced. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment holding the Fireman's Rule protected it from liability.

The Second District reversed. The Fireman's Rule limits the extent to which firefighters or other public officials may recover for injuries incurred when entering onto private property in the discharge of their duties such as fighting fires or other emergency situations. However, an occupier of land still has a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain its property in a safe condition to prevent injury that a firefighter might sustain from a cause independent of a fire. In the present case, plaintiff contended he was injured due to the negligent maintenance of the property while responding to a trouble alarm. Therefore, defendant owed a duty of reasonable care, and the Fireman's Rule did not apply. *Olson v. Williams All Season Co.*, 2012 IL App (2d) 110818 (8/9/12).

### **Animal Control Act Does Not Create Strict Liability on Owner Who Had Given Control of Dog to Veterinarian**

The defendant took her dog to a veterinarian for minor surgery. A clinic employee used its own noose and chain for walking the dog prior to surgery. The dog got away and ran to an area where the 8-year-old plaintiff was waiting for a school bus. The assistant yelled for help, and plaintiff attempted to pick up the dog who bit her on the right hand at the base of the thumb. She subsequently underwent three surgeries. The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that she did not have care or dominion over the dog at the time of the injury.

The Second District affirmed. The purpose of the Act is to encourage control of animals to protect the public from harm. It imposes penalties against both the owner and anyone who has control of the dog but does not impose strict liability based purely on ownership. Here the defendant was not in a position to control the dog or prevent injury. Rather, she relinquished care and control to the veterinarian, and there was no reason to believe it would allow the dog to escape and bite someone. *Hayes v. Adams*, 2013 IL App (2d) 12681 (2/28/13).

### **Landlord Not Liable When Tenant's Pit Bull Bites Neighbor Child**

A child was sitting on his front porch when the neighbor's pit bull got loose and bit him several times. He sued the neighbor under the Animal Control Act as well as the landlord who rented the home to the neighbor. The owner was sued under the Animal Control Act and was not part of the appeal. Plaintiff sued the landlord on the basis of private nuisance and negligence. The complaint alleged the landlord knew the dog was vicious and created a nuisance to the property as well as being negligent in failing to repair a gate in the yard. The trial court dismissed the claims against the landlord.

The First District affirmed. In order to sustain a private nuisance claim, plaintiff must establish that there was a substantial invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of property. The single incident of a dog escaping from the tenant's property through the broken gate was insufficient to constitute a private nuisance. The Court also noted there was no evidence supporting the claim that the landlord knew of the broken gate, and therefore, plaintiff could not prevail under a negligence theory. *Solorio v. Rodriguez*, 2013 IL App (1st) 121282 (3/22/13).

### **Landlord Not Liable Under Animal Control Act or Common Law Negligence For Tenant's Dog Attack**

The defendant hired Chitwood as superintendent of its water treatment plant and rented a home to him on a month-to-month basis. Chitwood had two dogs who he allowed to roam freely around the plant premises. However, after a couple of incidents when one dog growled at people, Chitwood was told he had to get rid of the dogs or find another place to live. Subsequently, the dog attacked plaintiff who was attending a family gathering at Chitwood's home. Plaintiff sued the defendant under the Animal Control Act and common law negligence for the dog's attack while on the defendant's property. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding the defendant did not "own" the dog within the meaning of the Act.

The Fourth District affirmed. The undisputed evidence showed that the injury occurred at a private family gathering on residential property that Chitwood rented from the defendant. A landlord/tenant relationship, without more, is insufficient to establish ownership under the Act. As the landlord did not exercise any measure of care or control of the dogs, it was not liable. The fact that the landlord could terminate Chitwood's tenancy did not constitute requisite control that imposed a common law duty it. *Howle v. Aqua*

*Illinois, Inc.*, 2012 IL App (4th) 120207 (3/31/12).

### **Cook County Forest Preserve Was Not an "Owner" of Dogs Who Attacked Two Ladies Walking Through Its Property**

In two separate incidents, dogs attacked ladies walking through the defendant's forest preserve. One lady died as a result of the attack, and the other was severely injured. Prior to the attack, a number of individuals had reported seeing aggressive dogs in the area. The forest preserve would call Cook County or the City of Chicago as it had no animal control department. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant permitted pit bulls to remain in the park and therefore would be liable under the Animal Control Act. The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the defendant.

The First District affirmed. It noted previous decisions under the Act require some measure of care, custody or control. It found there was no evidence to establish the defendant knowingly permitted the attack dogs to be on the property. Rather, the defendant on numerous occasions had called Cook County or Chicago Animal Control agents to remove them. The Forest Preserve District was no more than a passive owner of the property temporarily inhabited by the dogs. *Cieslewicz v. Forest Preserve District*, 2012 IL App (1st) 100801 (5/17/12).

### **DRAM SHOP**

#### **Setoff Procedure in Dram Shop Case Not Affected by Involvement of Guarantee Fund**

Parents filed a dram shop action against a tavern following their son's death in a vehicle collision with an intoxicated person who had been drinking at the defendant's bar. They received \$26,550 from the other driver's liability carrier. They also received \$80,000 from their own carrier for UIM and medical payments coverage. The defendant's insurance carrier became insolvent, and the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund handled the defense. It sought a determination that the dram shop liability should be limited to the statutory maximum of \$130,338.51 reduced by the monies received from the other driver and plaintiff's insurance. The trial court denied defendant's motion but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.

The Fifth District held the Guaranty Fund was a substitute for the insolvent insurer, and therefore, the Dram Shop Act would determine the amount to be recovered. It provides that the jury must first determine the total damages sustained. The award is then offset by other recoveries. If the remainder is above the statutory limit, it is reduced to that limit. Therefore, the dram shop remained potentially liable for the full amount of its statutory exposure of \$130,338.51.



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*Rogers v. Imeri*, 2012 IL App (5th) 110546 (3/12/13).

### CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENTS

#### Repairs Do Not Extend Ten-Year Construction Statute of Repose

Plaintiff was a policeman who was injured when he accidentally fell off an unguarded retaining wall while patrolling an area in the course of his duties on April 6, 2001. The wall was constructed in 1990, but a portion of the wall collapsed due to heavy rain and was rebuilt in 1994. Plaintiff fell from an area of the wall that had not been reconstructed. The defendant attempted to assert the Ten-Year Construction Statute of Repose, but the trial court refused on the basis that the 1994 reconstruction was the date from which the Repose period should begin. A St. Clair County jury found in favor of plaintiff but reduced the verdict by 50% for his contributory negligence.

In a split decision, the Fifth District reversed. The Statute of Repose applies to “an improvement to real property”, and the Court held that this required more than a mere repair or replacement but needed to be something which “substantially enhances the value of the property.” The Court also noted that the area where plaintiff fell had not been damaged by

rain and was not repaired in 1994. *Schott v. Halloran Construction Co., Inc.*, 2013 IL App (5th) 110428.

### RAILROAD

#### Railroad Owed No Duty to Child Trespassers Because Moving Freight Train Presented an Obvious Risk of Harm

A 12-year-old boy tried to jump aboard a moving train and severed his foot above the toes. The trial court held it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant should have constructed more adequate fencing to keep out children. A jury returned a verdict of \$3.875 million which was affirmed by the First District.

The Supreme Court reversed. Citing case law going back as far as 1897, it held a railroad does not have a duty to keep watch and warn boys not to jump onto its cars as “all men and ordinarily intelligent boys know it” is dangerous. *Choate v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co.*, 2012 IL 112948.

*We recommend the entire opinion be read and counsel consulted concerning the effect these decisions may have upon your claims —*

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